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Abstract
Some recent empirical studies found positive eﬀects of economic
liberalization on democratization. Based on these ﬁndings, this paper
explains why the sequence of economic liberalization and democrati-
zation is related to the eﬀects of the two reforms on economic per-
formance. Since economic liberalization increases the probability of
democratization and democratization leads to income redistribution,
in an economy with large inequality between the elite and the poor, the
elite do not implement economic liberalization, and democratization
occurs ﬁrst. In such an economy, the eﬀects of economic liberaliza-
tion and democratization are lower because of distortions caused by
large-scale income redistribution.
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This paper attempts to provide an explanation for the empirical facts found
by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) concerning the relationship between the
sequence of economic liberalization and democratization and the eﬀects on
economic performance. They found that the eﬀects of the two reforms on eco-
nomic performance1 (growth and investment) depend on the sequence of eco-
nomic liberalization and democratization and that countries where economic
liberalization occurs before democratization improve economic performance
more greatly through the two reforms. In countries where democratization
occurs ﬁrst, the positive eﬀects of economic liberalization are smaller than
those in countries where economic liberalization occurs ﬁrst, and the sum of
the eﬀects of the two reforms is also smaller. Economic liberalization deﬁned
in Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) includes trade liberalization as an important
element.
In this paper, we consider an economy in which there are two types of in-
dividuals, the elite and the poor. The elite are those who control the economy
before democratization and earn higher incomes, and the poor are those who
earn lower incomes. We will show that, if the income inequality between
the elite and the poor is suﬃciently large, democratization occurs before
economic liberalization and that, in such an economy, distortions caused by
large-scale income redistribution harm economic performance and the eﬀects
1Although they also studied the eﬀects on macroeconomic policy and the quality of
institutions, this paper focuses exclusively on the eﬀects on economic performance.
1of economic liberalization.
In a nondemocratic economy, the elite rule the government and make a
decision whether to implement economic liberalization. The elite will imple-
ment economic liberalization if the beneﬁt of economic liberalization exceeds
its cost. Economic liberalization increases the income of the elite as well as
the aggregate income in the economy. This is the beneﬁt for the elite of
implementing economic liberalization.
Some recent empirical studies found positive eﬀects of economic liber-
alization on democracy. Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2005) found that
trade openness has a positive eﬀect on the degree of democracy. Rudra
(2005) found that trade openness has a positive impact on democratization
if social welfare spending is high or increasing enough. Eichengreen and
Leblang (2006) found that trade openness positively aﬀects democracy and
vice versa.2 In this paper, we assume that opening an economy to interna-
tional trade by implementing economic liberalization makes the probability
of democratization higher. After democratization, policies preferred by the
poor are selected by majority voting, and the poor try to redistribute the
elite’s wealth among themselves. This is the cost to the elite of implementing
economic liberalization.
If the income inequality between the elite and the poor is large, the in-
come redistribution after democratization becomes large, and the cost of eco-
2Contrary to these studies, Li and Reuveny (2003) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005)
found that trade openness negatively aﬀects democracy, and Bussmann (2001) found that
trade openness has no eﬀect on democracy.
2nomic liberalization to the elite is large. Therefore, in an economy in which
the income inequality between the elite and the poor is large, the elite do
not implement economic liberalization, and democratization occurs before
economic liberalization since democratization occurs with some exogenous
probability in each time period. The poor prefer implementing economic
liberalization because it increases their income as well as the aggregate in-
come in the economy. Economic liberalization, therefore, will happen after
democratization. If the income inequality between the elite and the poor is
small, the cost of economic liberalization to the elite is small, and the elite
will implement economic liberalization on their own, and democratization
will occur after economic liberalization.
In the economy in which democratization occurs before economic liber-
alization, large income inequality leads to large-scale income redistribution
after democratization. Large-scale income redistribution leads to large-scale
taxation, and economic performance after democratization and economic lib-
eralization is bad because of distortions caused by large-scale taxation. 3
The logic used in the analysis of the elite’s decision about economic liber-
alization is essentially the same as that of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).
In their model, the poor cannot access education because of capital market
imperfections, and the elite determine the proportion of poor agents who
can access education, and subsidize their education. Education increases not
3This argument is related to studies of inequality and growth, such as those of Bertola
(1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
3only the income of those who access education but also the income of all in-
dividuals. This external eﬀect of education allows the elite to increase their
own income by subsidizing the education of poor agents. Although politi-
cal participation is limited to the elite at ﬁrst, education makes poor agents
politically active. Therefore, if the number of the poor who have received
education exceeds the number of the elite, political decisions are made by
the poor who have received education. In such a situation, the elite’s wealth
can be redistributed among the poor. Therefore in an economy in which
the income inequality between the elite and the poor is large, the elite fear
income redistribution, and the number of the poor who can access education
is small.4
The model of this paper is based on the model of Bourguignon and Verdier
(2000). However, the model of this paper has some diﬀerences from their
model. In the model of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), individuals live
for two periods, and the model is solved by backward induction. On the
other hand, in the model of this paper, individuals live forever, and the
equilibrium concept of this model is Markov Perfect Equilibrium. While the
elite determine the proportion of poor agents who can access education in
the model of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), in the model of this paper,
the elite make a decision whether to implement economic liberalization. On
one hand both of these policies beneﬁt the elite, on the other hand these
4Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) noted that their argument is reasonable in any context
of economic policies that beneﬁt the elite but also threaten the control of the elite.
4policies threaten the control of the elite. While political participation is
endogenously determined in the model of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000),
in the model of this paper, democratization occurs with some exogenous
probability in each period, and the key assumption of the model is that
economic liberalization increases the probability of democratization. The
contribution of this paper is to show that the empirical facts of Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005) regarding the relationship between the sequence of economic
liberalization and democratization and the eﬀects on economic performance
can be explained by the income inequality between the elite and the poor
and the distortions caused by income redistribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
setting of the model. In section 3, the model is analyzed, and the main
result is derived. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2 The setup of the model
In this section, we modify the model of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) to
analyze the manner in which the sequence of economic liberalization and
democratization and its eﬀects on the aggregate output are determined.
For modeling redistributive politics, we also follow Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006).
There are two types of individuals, the elite and the poor. We normalize
the size of the population to unity. The fraction ® of the population is the
5elite, the fraction 1 ¡ ® is the poor, and 0 < ® < 1
2. Let Y r and Y p denote
the income of the elite and the poor, respectively. The aggregate income in
the economy is given by ¯ Y = ®Y r + (1 ¡ ®)Y p. This equals the average
income as the size of the population is normalized to unity.
At the beginning, neither economic liberalization nor democratization has
occurred in this economy. Economic liberalization in this paper means lib-
eralization of international trade. However, this model does not explicitly
deal with international trade. Before democratization, the decision whether
to implement economic liberalization is made by the elite. After democrati-
zation, political decisions are made by majority voting. Since the poor make
up a majority of the population in this economy, the policies preferred by
the poor are selected in majority rule.
The income of each agent before economic liberalization is Y r = yr,
Y p = yp, and yr ¸ yp. Before economic liberalization, the aggregate income
in the economy is given by
®y
r + (1 ¡ ®)y
p ´ ¯ y: (1)
Since yr ¸ yp,
y
r ¸ ¯ y ¸ y
p:
After economic liberalization, the income of each agent becomes Y r =
yr + ´¯ y, Y p = yp + ´¯ y, and ´ > 0. ´¯ y represents the beneﬁt of economic lib-
eralization. After economic liberalization, the aggregate income is (1 + ´)¯ y.
6Sachs and Werner (1995), Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005) found that economic liberalization positively aﬀects eco-
nomic growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) and Alcala and Ciccone (2004)
also found that trade openness has a positive eﬀect on income per capita.
Therefore, the assumption that economic liberalization increases the aggre-
gate income in the economy appears to be plausible. In addition, we assume
that both the elite and the poor enjoy the beneﬁt of economic liberalization.
In practice, there would be some losers by economic liberalization, and they
would attempt to block economic liberalization. However, this paper neglects
losers by economic liberalization for simplicity. The assumption that the size
of the beneﬁt of economic liberalization is common to all individuals is for
simplicity.
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we introduce x ´
®yr
¯ y as a
measure of inequality between the elite and the poor.5 The variable x rep-
resents the elite’s share of total income before economic liberalization. Since
1 ¡ x =
(1¡®)yp







(1 ¡ x)¯ y
1 ¡ ®
; (2)
and x ¸ ®, as yr ¸ yp. The larger x is, the larger the degree of inequality
between the elite and the poor before economic liberalization will be.
5Alternatively, we can describe inequality by the diﬀerence between the income level
of the elite and that of the poor as in Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and derive almost
the same result.
7As stated in the Introduction, we assume that democratization occurs
with some probability in each period and that economic liberalization in-
creases the probability of democratization. Let p be the probability of de-
mocratization before economic liberalization, and let ˆ p be the probability of
democratization after economic liberalization and assume that ˆ p > p. The
probability of democratization is exogenously given in this paper.
After democratization, the poor can redistribute the elite’s income by lin-
ear income tax and lump-sum transfer. We denote the tax rate by ¿ 2 [0;1].
Taxation is costly; following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we represent
the cost of taxation by
C(¿)¯ Y
and assume that the function C(¢) satisﬁes the following conditions:
C
0(¢) > 0 C
00(¢) > 0 C
0(0) = 0 C
0(1) = 1 C(0) = 0:
The cost of taxation represents distortions caused by taxation. Let T de-
note the amounts of the lump-sum transfer; then, the government budget
constraint is given by
T = ¿(®Y
r + (1 ¡ ®)Y
p) ¡ C(¿)¯ Y ´ ¿ ¯ Y ¡ C(¿)¯ Y ; (3)
8and the post-tax income for each individual is given by
(1 ¡ ¿)Y
i + T = Y
i + ¿(¯ Y ¡ Y
i) ¡ C(¿)¯ Y i = r;p: (4)








t i = r;p; (5)




denote the level of consumption of the elite and the poor at time period t
respectively. Consumption equals the post-tax income because there is no
savings. The parameter ¯ 2 (0;1) denotes the discount rate.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. If democratization has not
occurred until period t ¡ 1, then:
1. If economic liberalization has not occurred, the elite make a decision
whether to implement economic liberalization;
2. If economic liberalization has occurred, democratization occurs with
probability ˆ p. If economic liberalization has not occurred, democrati-
zation occurs with probability p;
3. If democratization has occurred, the poor choose the tax rate;
4. If democratization has occurred and economic liberalization has not
occurred, the poor make a decision whether to implement economic
9liberalization.
If democratization has occurred until period t ¡ 1, then:
1. The poor choose the tax rate;
2. If economic liberalization has not occurred, the poor make a decision
whether to implement economic liberalization.
We assume that free trade and democracy last forever once economic lib-
eralization and democratization have occurred. We derive Markov Perfect
Equilibrium, where the action of each agent at each point depends only on
the payoﬀ-relevant state of the economy at the point.
The state of the economy in this model consists of the state of the polit-
ical regime (democracy or nondemocracy) and the state of the trade regime
(whether economic liberalization is implemented or not). We denote the state
of the political regime by D and ND, where D and ND represent democracy
and nondemocracy respectively. We also denote the state of the trade regime
by L and NL. If economic liberalization has occurred, the state of the trade
regime is L, and if not, the state of the trade regime is NL.
3 Analysis
First, we consider the decision of the poor about economic liberalization in
the state (D, NL). The post-tax income of the poor before economic liberal-
10ization is
y
p + ¿(¯ y ¡ y
p) ¡ C(¿)¯ y;
and the post-tax income of the poor after economic liberalization is
y
p + ´¯ y + ¿(¯ y ¡ y
p) ¡ C(¿)(1 + ´)¯ y:
By the assumptions on the function C(¢), it can be easily derived that 1 ¡
C(¿) > 0 for any ¿ 2 [0;1]. Therefore, for any ¿ 2 [0;1], the post-tax income
of the poor after economic liberalization is larger than the post-tax income of
the poor before economic liberalization, and the poor liberalize the economy
in the state (D, NL).
Next, we consider the choice of the tax rate of the poor in the state
(D, NL) and (D, L). Since the poor liberalize the economy in the state (D,





p + ´¯ y + ¿(¯ y ¡ y
p) ¡ C(¿)(1 + ´)¯ y:













(1 ¡ ®)(1 + ´)C00(¿¤)
> 0: (7)
Therefore, the larger the inequality between the elite and the poor is, the
higer tax rate the poor prefer.
Finally, we consider the decision of the elite about economic liberalization
in the state (ND, NL). Let V1 denote the payoﬀ that the elite receive when
they implement economic liberalization, and let V0 denote the payoﬀ that
the elite receive when they do not implement economic liberalization.
If the elite open the economy to international trade, democratization
occurs with probability ˆ p. If the elite open the economy and democratization




r + ´¯ y + ¿
¤(¯ y ¡ y
r) ¡ C(¿
¤)(1 + ´)¯ y):
If the elite open the economy and democratization does not occur in this
period, the payoﬀ to the elite can be written as
y
r + ´¯ y + ¯V1:
12Therefore, we have


























If the elite do not implement economic liberalization, democratization
occurs with probability p. Since economic liberalization is implemented by
the poor after democratization, the payoﬀ that the elite receive when they





r + ´¯ y + ¿
¤(¯ y ¡ y
r) ¡ C(¿
¤)(1 + ´)¯ y):
If the elite do not implement economic liberalization and democratization
does not occur in this period, the payoﬀ to the elite can be written as
y
r + ¯V0:
Therefore, the expected value of not implementing economic liberalization



















(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
(´¯ y + ¿
¤(¯ y ¡ y
r) ¡ C(¿
¤)(1 + ´)¯ y):
(11)
We deﬁne V as
V ´ V1 ¡ V0: (12)
If V > 0, the elite implement economic liberalization at t=0, and democra-
tization occurs with probability ˆ p in each period. If V < 0, the elite do not
implement economic liberalization, democratization occurs with probability
p in each period, and economic liberalization is implemented by the poor
after democratization. By (9) and (11), V is given by
V =
1 ¡ p




(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ˆ p)¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
¡
p
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
¶
£ (¿
¤(¯ y ¡ y
r) ¡ C(¿
¤)(1 + ´)¯ y): (13)






(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ˆ p)¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
¡
p


















¯ y < 0: (14)
Therefore, the incentive for the elite to implement economic liberalization de-
creases as the inequality represented by x increases. Large inequality leads to
large income redistribution after democratization and makes the elite avoid
implementing economic liberalization, which increases the probability of de-
mocratization.
Since yr ¸ yp, the range that x can take is [®;1]. When x = ®, ¿¤ = 0,
and the value of V equals
1¡p
1¡(1¡p)¯´¯ y > 0. When x = 1, ¿¤ = C0¡1( 1
1+´) ´ ˜ ¿,
and the value of V equals
1 ¡ p




(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ˆ p)¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
¡
p







¡ C(˜ ¿)(1 + ´)
¶
¯ y: (15)
We assume that the value of (15) is negative. This assumption follows when
the beneﬁt of economic liberalization is not too large or ® is suﬃciently small
or C(˜ ¿) is suﬃciently large. Then, since V is decreasing in x, there exists
some x¤ 2 (®;1), and V < 0 if x > x¤ and V > 0 if x < x¤. Therefore, if x >
x¤, the elite do not implement economic liberalization; the elite implement
economic liberalization only when x < x¤.
15In an economy in which inequality is suﬃciently small (x < x¤), eco-
nomic liberalization occurs before democratization. The eﬀect of economic
liberalization on the aggregate income is given by ´¯ y, and the eﬀect of de-
mocratization on the aggregate income is given by ¡C(¿¤)(1 + ´)¯ y. After
democratization, the aggregate income is given by
(1 ¡ C(¿
¤))(1 + ´)¯ y: (16)
On the other hand, in an economy in which x is larger than x¤, democra-
tization occurs before economic liberalization, and democratization decreases
the aggregate income by ¡C(¿¤)¯ y.6 Although economic liberalization is im-
plemented by the poor after democratization, its eﬀect on the aggregate
income is (1 ¡ C(¿¤))´¯ y and smaller than ´¯ y (the eﬀect of economic liberal-
ization in an economy with x < x¤).
The total eﬀect of the two reforms is given by
(´ ¡ C(¿
¤)(1 + ´))¯ y:
The total eﬀect is larger in an economy with x < x¤ than in an economy
with x > x¤ (recall that ¿¤ is increasing in x, and C(¢) is increasing in ¿).
In other words, the total eﬀect is larger in an economy in which economic
6Although democratization may have a positive eﬀect on the aggregate output, it
merely causes income redistribution and has no positive eﬀect on the output in this model.
However, the model can be modiﬁed to include the positive eﬀect of democratization and
derive almost the same result.
16liberalization occurs before democratization.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we modiﬁed the model of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)
and analyzed how the sequence of economic liberalization and democratiza-
tion and its eﬀects on economic performance are determined. In an economy
in which inequality between the elite and the poor is suﬃciently large, the
elite do not implement economic liberalization, and democratization occurs
before economic liberalization. In such an economy, economic liberalization
is implemented under large-scale taxation; thus, its eﬀect on the aggregate
income is relatively small. Moreover, the total eﬀect of democratization and
economic liberalization is higher in an economy in which economic liberal-
ization occurs ﬁrst than that of an economy in which democratization occurs
ﬁrst. These results are consistent with the evidence obtained by Giavazzi
and Tabellini (2005).
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that the probability of democra-
tization does not depend on x. However, democratization may be related
to inequality between the elite and the poor. In some models that explain
the process of democratization endogenously, inequality is a key factor. In
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), if income inequality between the elite and
the poor is suﬃciently large, the elite block democratization. Furthermore,
in the model of democratization of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), the rela-
17tionship between inequality and democratization is not monotonic, and too
low or too high levels of inequality hinder democratization. If inequality is an
important determinant of democratization, the model of this paper should
be extended to endogenize the process of democratization and the eﬀect of
inequality on democratization.
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